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This paper reviewed literatures on ethnic conflicts in Nigeria. The
review showed that Nigeria is blessed with diverse ethnic groups.
However, over the years, “this blessing has turned to a wound eating
deep into the flesh of the national unity of the country”. It might be
said that the amalgamation of the Northern and Southern
protectorates by the colonial administration is the root course of the
ethnic conflicts experienced all over the country till this day.
However, the entrenchment of the democratic rule in 1999 brought a
ray of hope for the citizens. Sadly, democracy has failed to
completely unite the people of Nigeria; this is evident in the scores
of conflicts in different parts of the country. Authors and
Researchers have blamed the incessant conflict on the
marginalization of different ethnic groups in the country. It is
against this background that the research explored views on
participative democracy and proffers it as a solution to ethnic
conflicts in Nigeria. This paper explored ethnic conflicts in Nigeria
and participatory democracy as a means of tackling ethnic conflicts.
The nation Nigeria is the brain child of the amalgamation of the
northern and southern protectorates by the British colonial
administration under the watch of Sir Fredrick Lord Lugard in 1914.
This process brought about the merging of people of diverse belief
and culture into a single entity. The amalgamation of the northern




Philosophy Department, Nnamdi Azikiwe UniversityAwka
&
Aghamelu Helen Udumaga





and southern protectorates was done in the “wisdom” of the colonial
power masters to promote national unity and integration. However,
the decision to amalgamate the protectorates have been criticized
by authors, commentators and researchers as being ill advised and
self serving of the British. It is believed that members of the
protectorates were not consulted on the planned merger (Nwaoga,
Nche & Olihe, 2014). This view is echoed in the comment of
Awolowo (1947) who said that “
This proclamation goes a long way to portray the frustration of
persons of divergent cultural and religious beliefs who are
forcefully and unwillingly joined in an unholy union. In
consonance, Thompson in Achebe (2012) opined that “….the
amalgamation of the southern and northern protectorates,
inextricably complicated Nigeria's destiny. Animists, Muslims and
Christians alike were held together by a delicate, some say artificial
lattice”. According to Ojo (2014), “
The result of this
unholy union have resulted in the continuous state of disunity,
political instability, general insecurity of lives and property, mutual
suspicion and distrust among the diverse ethnic nationalities that
make up the geographical entity called Nigeria.
In line with the above, Adetoye and Omilusi (2015) observed that
Nigeria is not a nation. It is a mere
geographical expression. There are no “Nigerians” in the same
sense as there are “English,” “Welsh” or “French.” The word
'Nigerian' is merely a distinctive appellation to distinguish those
who live within the boundaries of Nigeria from those who do not.”
the systemic forceful
unappealing catastrophic and uncongenial institutionalized
querulous cementation of divergence caste artificially orchestrated
and certificated by the British colonialism mainly to ease the
challenge of onerous task in socio-political milieu of Nigeria has
underscored sore Achilles heel engraved with irrevocable creation
of indelible pauperization of Nigerian political web consequent in a
state of passivity and fait accompli. The incompatibility of multi-
diverse ethnic configuration has fuelled the acidulous ember
manifestation of rigmarole, cataleptic, catatonic and chaotic
political arrangement of Nigeria while identity politics becomes a
prodigious threat to the sustenance of Nigerian.”
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the lack of cohesiveness in the nation's polity has been demonstrated
by the trenchant call for Sovereign National Conference in some
parts of the country, resource control as well as persistent wave of
political, inter-ethnic and sectional violence. The authors further
averred that some groups saw the return to democracy as an
opportunity to express grievances. These expressions of grievances
has led to the occurrence and re-occurrence of ethno-religious and
political conflicts. In consonance, Ojo (2014) opined that the unjust
and unequal sharing of socio-political and geographical landscape
intentionally manufactured by British administration that called for
Northern region domination, leaving the southern region in
lassitude in political investment of Nigeria has generated a
longstanding debate. The author further observed that the southern
region has lagged behind in the cringe worthy political
representation which called for cautionary tale in the political
processes of Nigeria. This has recently led to the increased agitation
of the Biafran state through the broadcast of radio Biafra. The
subsequent arrest of Nnamdi Kanu who is adjudged to be the
operator of radio Biafra has heightened the political protest in most
towns in the South-East and South-South geopolitical zones of
Nigeria.
In the North East geopolitical zone of Nigeria, Bokoharam have
continuously and persistently slaughtered and killed thousands of
Nigerian citizens in cities and villages in Adamawa, Borno and
Yobe states. Despite the December deadline given to the Nigerian
Military by President Mohamed Buhari, the insurgent group have
continuously attacked the populace in the Nigeria especially in the
states in the North East. The most disheartening is the use of
innocent and young females as suicide bombers in their mindless
and senseless actions. In a separate development in Benue state, the
cattle breeders and farmers have constantly been at loggerhead.
These situations have claimed the life of hundreds on both side of
the divide. It is disheartening to note that the parlance “One Nigeria”
is a mere farce that is not imbedded in the heart of many Nigeria. It is
sad to note that the country Nigeria is just the amalgamation of
different ethnic groups who are detached in believes and moral,
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hence the “we versus them” attitude. It is against this background
that the author explores the concepts of peace and conflict with a
view to ameliorate the conflagration of conflicts that burden the
country through the promotion of participative democracy amongst
her citizenry.
Conflict is a universal feature of human society. It takes its origins in
economic differentiation, social change, cultural formation,
psychological development and political organization all of which
are inherently conflictual and becomes overt through the formation
of conflict parties, which come to have, or are perceived to have,
mutually incompatible goals. This is why Adetoye and Omilusi
(2015) stated that conflict entails struggle and rivalry for objects to
which individuals and groups attach importance. In their
description of components of conflicts; Osagbae and Suberu (2005)
opined that the material objects in relation to conflict may include
scarce resources like money, employment, and position including
political ones, promotion in both the private and public
organizations. The non-material objects include culture, tradition,
religion and language. The identity of the conflict parties, the levels
at which the conflict is contested, and the issues fought over (scarce
resources, unequal relations, competing values) may vary over time
and may themselves be disputed. Conflicts are dynamic as they
escalate and de-escalate, and are constituted by a complex interplay
of attitudes and behaviours that can assume a reality of their own.
Third parties are likely to be involved as the conflict develops, and
may themselves thereby become parties in an extended conflict.
In another vein, Galtung (1967) proposed an influential model of
conflict that encompasses both symmetric and asymmetric
conflicts. He suggested that conflict could be viewed as a triangle,
with contradiction (C), attitude (A) and behaviour (B) at its vertices.
In a symmetric conflict, the contradiction is de?ned by the parties,
their interests and the clash of interests between them. In an
asymmetric conflict, it is de?ned by the parties, their relation- ship
Conceptualizing Conflict
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and the conflict of interests inherent in the relationship. The
conflictual attitude includes the parties' perceptions and
misperceptions of each other and of themselves. This can be
positive or negative, but in violent conflicts parties tend to develop
demeaning stereotypes of the other, and attitudes are often
influenced by emotions such as fear, anger, bitterness and hatred.
Attitude covers emotive (feeling), cognitive (belief) and conative
(desire, will) elements.
Behaviour is the third component. It can involve cooperation or
coercion, gestures signifying conciliation or hostility. Violent
conflict behaviour is characterized by threats, coercion and
destructive attacks. Analysts who emphasize objective aspects such
as structural relationships, competing material interests or
behaviours are said to have an instrumental view of the sources of
conflict. All the three components have to be present together in a
full conflict. A con?ict structure without conflictual attitudes or
behaviour is a latent (or structural) one. Galtung saw conflict as a
dynamic process in which structure; attitudes and behaviour are
constantly changing and influencing one another. As the dynamic
develops, it becomes a manifest conflict formation, as parties'
interests clash or the relationship they are in becomes oppressive.
Parties then organize around this structure to pursue their interests.
They develop hostile attitudes and conflictual behaviour.And so the
conflict formation starts to grow and intensify. As it does so, it may
widen, drawing in other parties, deepen and spread, generating
secondary conflicts within the main parties or among outsiders who
get sucked in. This often considerably complicates the task of
addressing the original, core conflict. Eventually, however,
resolving the conflict must involve a set of dynamic changes that
mean de-escalation of conflict behaviour, a change in attitudes, and
a transformation of the relationships or clashing interests that are at
the core of the conflict structure. A related idea due to Galtung
(1990) is the distinction between direct violence (children are
murdered), structural violence (children die through poverty) and
cultural violence (whatever blinds us to this or seeks to justify it).
We end direct violence by changing conflict behaviour, structural
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violence by removing structural contradictions and injustices, and
cultural violence by changing attitudes.
Ethnicity should be seen as arising in any situation where a group of
people, no matter how small, with different cultural and linguistic
attributes from those of its neighbours; uses this as the basis of
solidarity and interaction with others. In so doing, the group sees
itself not only as distinct, but as a "group in itself and for itself
(Anugwom, 200). In other words, socio-cultural consciousness of
oneness develops and forms the basis of interaction with and
participation in other socio-cultural processes, especially in power
and resource allocation, within a larger social group or state. And
this consciousness is most crucial in the definition of an ethnic
group. Ethnicity implies the fact that the group feels ethnocentric
towards others; that is, it sees other groups as relatively inferior and
more or less as rivals. This feeling brings about certain attitudes,
which distort reality and breed subjectivity in the evaluation and
perception of events. Ethnicity is also characterised by a common
consciousness of being. And this factor, more than any other,
defines the boundary of the group that is relevant for understanding
ethnicity at any point in time (Nnoli, 1978). Ethnicity, in addition,
often contains an obscured class component. In this sense, it
becomes a tool for the elite members of society to hold on to their
privileges. Ethnicity, according to Nnoli in Akindiyo (2013) is a
social phenomenon that is associated with interactions among
members of different ethnic groups. Nnoli explained that ethnic
groups are social formations distinguished by the communal
character of their boundaries. The author noted that such groups
may be distinct in terms of language, culture, or both. According to
Nnoli, language has clearly been the most crucial dividing factor in
Africa and Nigeria in particular. Nigeria is undoubtedly a plural
society with different ethnic groups, religions, languages, cultures
and institutional arrangements. As a heterogeneous society, 374
ethnic groups have been identified each interacting with one another
in competition for power and wealth. This has resulted into ethnic
Ethnicity in Nigeria's Democracy
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conflict (Salawu & Hassan, 2011). The history of ethnic conflict in
Nigeria can be traced back to the colonial and post colonial era.
Ojo (2014) posited that the colonial tripartite division of Nigeria
prevented a Nigerian nationalistic movement, manipulating
geographical boundaries to reinforce separation between ethnic
groups and transforming ethnicity into an identity by which to gain
political power; this structure along with other administrative
decisions emphasized ethnic nationalism and regional politics,
resulting from significant uneven development within each region.
According to Ebegbulem (2011), colonial division of Nigeria that
reinforced ethnic groups, the rise of ethno-political consciousness,
and the development of ethnic/regional political parties
demonstrated that the British administration intentionally
prevented the rise and success of Nigerian nationalism, instead
promoting ethnic nationalism as a means to gain political power. It
is believed that Lord Frederick Lugard's 1914-18 constitutional
exercises, which resulted in the amalgamation of the separate
protectorates of Southern Nigeria and Cameroon with the
protectorate of Northern Nigeria, were carried out without any
explicit consent from Nigerians. As a result of this action, Okoye
(2005) opined that provinces and other divisions were created
according to the wisdom and convenience of imperial British
officials. This influenced the ethnic consciousness of Nigerians.
The wave of ethnic crisis in the country can also be traced to the
creation of three regions by the British government using the two
major rivers, the Niger and the Benue rivers to divide the country
into three geographical units, namely, the North, East and West.
The unjust nature of the division is encapsulated in the words of Ojo
(2014) who averred that the “division exacerbated the country's
ethnic problems. Firstly, the regions were not equal; the Northern
region was the size of the Eastern and Western regions combined.
Secondly, the three regions were created without due consideration
of minority groups that abound in these regions”.
The division of Nigeria into three regions in 1946 by Richard
Constitution for administrative convenience was directly associated
with the three major ethnic groups – Yoruba, Hausa and Igbo. It is
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not surprising therefore that the first political parties were formed
along ethnic lines. During the first republic, politics was organized
in the same way as during the pre-colonial era. It was still the AG,
NCNC, NPC and other minor parties like the Northern Elements
Progressive Union (NEPU) by Aminu Kano; and United Middle
Belt Congress (UMBC) led by Joseph Tarka. There was no radical
departure from those of the pre-colonial era as the parties had ethnic
colouration in terms of leadership and regional affiliations.
However, it was in the Second Republic that regionalism was
played down a bit. And it was because the 1979 constitution
stipulated that for a political party to be registered, it must be
national in outlook. The new political parties that were registered
had their leadership replicated along ethnic lines as in the first
republic. Thus, Obafemi Awolowo retained the leadership of AG
which metamorphosed into Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN), Nnamdi
Azikiwe controlled the Igbo speaking areas under Nigeria's People
Party (NPP), which is an offshoot of the old NCNC. National Party
of Nigeria (NPN) dominated the Hausa-Fulani areas; Peoples
Redemption Party (PRP) in Hausa speaking while Great Nigeria
Peoples Party (GNPP) led by Ibrahim Waziri controlled the Kanuri
speaking area. Therefore, ethnic affiliation played out in political
party formation and operation during the 2nd Republic. James
(2011) asserted that voting patterns equally followed ethnic lines in
the elections. It Akindiyo (2013) pointed out that political parties
formation had a different dimension in the Third Republic which
was led by President Ibrahim Babangida's government. These were
the Social Democratic Party (SDP) and the National Republican
Convention (NRC). Even though these parties were established by
government, ethno-religious cleavages were visible in the
membership and composition of the two parties. While the SDP
favoured the southerners, NRC was a party for the Hausa-Fulani
North as could be observed from their operation. In the Fourth
Republic, ethnic colouration has reared its ugly head. The All
Nigeria's Peoples Party (ANPP), Alliance for Democracy can still
be traced to Hausa-Fulani and Yoruba ethnic groups. The ruling
Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) is being perceived as to have
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deviated a bit from the usual ethno-religious dominated party
politics of the past with their membership and formation cutting
across the clime of Nigeria. The amalgamation of political parties
like the Action Congress of Nigeria (ACN), All Nigeria's Peoples
Party (ANPP), Congress for Progressive Change (CPC) and a
faction of the (APGA) gave birth to
All Progressive GrandAlliance (APC) in February 2013.APC came
on board as a party of unity, the goal of which is to change and
wrestle power from the Peoples Democratic Party. It appeared that
majority of Nigerian bought the political manifestos of the APC,
this resulted in the emergence of President Mohamoud Buhari in the
2015 presidential elections. However, this union has not dulled the
feeling of ethnicity in Nigeria's politics.
That the Nigeria state as a composition of so many identities is not a
coincidence, rather it is as a result of its historical construction by
the colonial master. Although, the Nigerian nationalist were
pessimistic on the foundation on which the Nigerian state was built.
The fact that Nigerians were forcefully integrated by the British
against their wish and the lack of understanding of identities by the
different ethnic groups further confirms this pessimism. According
to Arazeen and Saka (2007), the union of ethnic groups in Nigeria
through the 1914 amalgamation was a marriage of inconveniency
because the whole process was conceived and executed without due
respect to and for social-cultural and political differences embedded
in the political, economic and social structures of the wedded
couple. The pessimism observed was reinforced by the reality of
pre-colonial identity construction where identity was mobilized
along ethnic and sub-ethnic line against migrant settlers who were
displaced either by natural occurrence, war, artificial boundary and
lack of resources which continue to generate conflict due to the
discrimination against the immigrants by the original settlers
(Osaghae & Suberu, 2005). For example Modakeke migration to
Oyo due to the internecine wars in Yoruba land crisis, Urhobo and
Ijaw into Warri where the Itsekiri people claimed to have been the
All Progressives GrandAlliance
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original settler; the migration of the Jukun-Chamba from Cameroun
to the present day Taraba state, originally settled by the Kuteb and
the settlement of Hausa merchants in Zangon-Kataf within a
territory occupied by the Kataf (Isomounah, 2003). As earlier
stated, colonialism was the cradle of ethnicity in Nigeria (Nnoli,
1978), and a key factor in the crystallization of contemporary
identities. (Osaghae & Suberu, 2005) The amalgamation of the
Northern and Southern Nigeria in 1914 was basically for the
economic interest of the British rather than a deliberate attempt at
integration of identities. This has generated blame on colonialist as
being responsible for the woes of the country. Whether colonialist
are to be blamed for ethnicity problems in Nigeria or not the truth
however is that the amalgamation of Nigeria promoted modern
economic opportunities in emerging colonial centre leading to the
influx of people from the Yoruba and Igbo into northern cities such
as Kano, Jos, Kaduna and Zaria and also people from the North to
the southern cities like Lagos and Ibadan. The British reaction was
to prevent inter- ethnic tension by creating a culturally artificial
political entity called “Strangers Quarters” or “Sabon- Gari” for
preventing non-Muslims immigrants from interacting with
Muslims in the North. Similarly, the same policy also applied to
Muslim from interacting with Christians in the South. The sense in
this is to prevent the destabilizing effect of the cultural incursion of
other identities. Coleman (1958) characterizes this new artificial
colonial construction as “aggregation of tribal unions” where these
associations provided members of their ethnic group with social
security and welfare generally denied them by the colonialists and
equipped them to compete with other members of other ethnic
group. This eventually allows the ethnic group to coalesce into pan-
ethnic national organization such as the Igbo Federation Union
(later Igbo state Union), Egbe Omo Oduduwa (organization of the
descendant of Oduduwa and the mythical founder of Yoruba race)
and the Jamiyyah Mutanen Arewa (Northern People's Congress).
The implication of this transformations and ethnic alienation from
one another became one of the strong bases for conflictual identity
formation and discriminatory practice as could be seen in the ethno-
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religious crisis in Kano in 1953 and 1966, Maitatsine religious crisis
in 1980, Faggae inter-religious violence in 1982, Behead the
Infidel-Allah Akbar conflict in1994, Jos-Pleateau Carnage in 2001,
In support of Afghanistan” the ethno-religious killing in 2001,
Sharia crisis in 2000.(Abdu, 2011). In Southern part of Nigeria, the
Shagamu reprisal attack in 1999 and myriads of ethno-religious
conflict in Lagos, Ibadan and many other places in the southern part
of the country. The ethnic segregation strategy of identity
integration of the colonialist was further exacerbated by the
establishment of federal structure of three units. That is the North
region, West region and East region. The regional structure was
constructed to accommodate the identities of the major ethnic
formation, Hausa-Fulani, (North) Yoruba (West) and Ibo (East)
without adequately capturing the ethnic minority components in the
major ethnic group.
In another vein, the establishment of the federal structure led to the
incessant minority agitation for their own autonomy and the
growing feelings of nationalism among these groups. Since the
federal structure does not ensure the protection and security of the
minority interest, their agitation became deepened. According to
Osaghae and Suberu (2005), the federal arrangement encouraged an
enormous degree of ethno-regional polarization as the imbalances
tripartite ethno- regional structure even with the creation of Mid-
Western state) collapsed into bipolar north-south confrontation. The
post colonial Nigeria had witnessed two contradictory tendencies.
The first is the continuation and aggravation as well as proliferation
of colonial conflict legacies. The second is the tendency in post
colonial Nigeria to manage identity conflict through federalist
practice. The aggravation of ethnic identity after independence in
Nigeria was due to the lopsided federal structure which eventually
implicated on the violent ethno-political discontent prevalent
during the post-colonial Nigeria. Indeed the incessant
disenchantment and frustrations of the ethnic minority under the
federal structure accounted for the Tiv riot 1962 1964 the
secessionist campaign of Isaac Adako Boro and his Ijaw group.
Other ethno-regional conflicts were also expressed through the
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Census crisis of 1963/63, 1964 federal election, sectional military
intervention and the counter coup of 1966. Rather than the lopsided
structure of the Nigerian federalism to be restructured by addressing
the minority question through the creation of sub-federal regional
units, the crisis of the federation was deepen with unification decree
leading to the attempted secessions of the Biafra republic and the
eventual outbreak of 30 month civil war. The aftermath of the civil
war was the relative period of peace and stability for the country in
terms of ethnic conflict. The stability was a measure of
transformation of the federation into a horizontally balanced union.
The dissolution of the four region into twelve state and nineteen
respectively, the use of oil revenue to douse inter-group resource
conflict through ethno-distributive measures, including (provision
of infrastructure in the new state administrative capital and the
expansion of the general distributive pool account (DPA) under the
revenue allocation system) and innovative statutory mechanism of
ethnic conflict accommodation (federal character principle and the
interregional distribution requirement for the election of the federal
republic). In spite of the measure of stability during this period, it
was still mark by semblance of sectional tension as dispute over
1973 and 1975 killing of the head of state was the flash point.
However, the relative peace and stability enjoyed during the period
was broken by the Maitatsine which claimed lot of lives and the
Kafanchan-Kaduna ethno-religious crisis which reawaken the age-
long Muslim and non-Muslim tension in the North. The Nigeria
military as a stabilizing force to the manifestation of ethnic-
nationalism were able to curtailed and bottle up the aggravated
ethno-religious and regional diversities in the country between
1983-1999, suppressing the diverse tendencies and maintain the
corporate existence of the country through creation of more states
and review in revenue allocation formula as well as the sub-
regional creation of the six geographical zone. The military
however were not immune from the ethno- nationalist aggravation
which has remained a dominant factor in Nigeria politics (Duruji,
2010). The perception of some section of the society is that the
military is serving the interest of the Hausa- Fulani major ethnic
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group since they dominate the military institution of Nigeria
exercising hegemony over its major institutional structure of the
security apparatus of the state (Fatai, 2012). This has further
exploded and increased contemporary ethnic tension and identity
relation in Nigeria.
Fatai (2012) believed that the emergence of democracy in 1999
opened up the democratic space for ethnic expression and
transformation which hitherto had been bottled up by the Military
and authoritarian regime before 1999 Nigeria. One of the most
appealing aspects of democracy as a system of governance is the
expendable system of rights that must be guaranteed, even though it
brings with it its peculiar sets of problem (Duruji, 2010) The
peculiar problem becomes more obvious in a multicultural
compositional society because while managing identities problem
in a multi-ethnic society poses a challenge, the truth however is that
democracy offers opportunities for groups to express their feelings
and putting their demand across to the state irrespective of their
diversities. By this democracy is seen as the instrumentality for
addressing monopolization of power by 'single ethnic group' or a
'group of ethnic groups' in the country as well as the restoration of
political stability in a multi-ethnic society. The Hausa-Fulani
hegemony and the marginalization of other ethnic group during the
military era was the issue that dominates the national political
discourse prior to 1999. Of the 50 years rule, the military had rule for
29years and the Hausa-Fulani ethnic extraction has, had more
benefit from the federal power at the expense of other ethnic groups.
The tactical alienation of the Ibo in the federal power on account of
their suspicion after the Biafra attempt at secession by the federal
government had continue to be a source of agitation on the part of
the Ibo major ethnic group. More generally the North/South divide
shows a picture of a marginalized south given the control of the
political machinery of the state by the North over a long period of
time: for instance the annulment of the June 12 1993 election
acclaimed to have been won by MKO Abiola believed to be
Yoruba's opportunity for the presidency also raises issues on the
deliberate scheme of the Hausa-Fulani major ethnic group to hold
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on to power at the expense of other major ethnic group. The event of
1993-94 must be seen in the context of an enduring pattern of ethnic
antagonism and inequality where the Hausa-Fulani is perceived as
'other' (Adebanwi, 2004). Duruji (2010) asserted that this situation
is a negation of democracy which gives equal opportunity for
political contestants without restricting anyone. This view goes to
argued that democracy is not a panacea for resolving ethnic
contestation, for democracy will be undermine in a multi-ethnic
society where majority interest are as important as those of the
minority interest. The democratic opening therefore provides the
platform and space for the resurgence of long- repressed demand for
the restructuring of the Nigeria federation on a more equitable basis
and calling to question the domination of the Hausa-Fulani
hegemony. The emergence of ethnic militant organization was seen
as platform for bringing into the open complaints that were
previously mouthed with hushed tones, thanks to the transition to
democracy (Ubani 2006). The manifestation of insurgencies in the
name of ethnic militia such as Oodua People's Congress (OPC),
Egbesu Boys of Africa (EBA) Arewa People's Congress (APC)
(While the first two were keen on the restructuring of the Nigerian
federation (based on the outcome of sovereign national conference)
to allow for autonomy, self-determination, resource control and
social emancipation (Fatai, 2012), the third APC is keen on
maintaining the status quo and preventing the marginalization of the
North. The impoverish condition due to the neglect and
marginalization of the Niger-delta region where the country major
resources-oil is been generated has also spiraled minority ethnic
militant groupings, such as the Ijaw Youth Council (IYC)-which
arose from the Ijaw National Congress), the Movement for the
Emancipation of the Niger-Delta (MEND) which arose from the
Niger-Delta Volunteer Force (NDPVF) and the Federated Niger
Delta Ijaw Communities (FNDIC). These militant groups
predicated their struggle on resource control and regional political
autonomy. The phase of their struggle has however changed with
time as their struggle against the Multinational Corporation later
change to targeting the state and its national heritage.Apart from the
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prevalence of ethnic militant, there was also flashpoint of sectarian
and communal clashes. Hardly as the democratic government
settled down that Ijaw/Itsekiri clashes exploded, Ife/Modakeke,
Kaduna and Jos were all evidence of communal and identity clashes
in 1999. These crises were further compounded by the Sharia crisis
in the North, pitching the Christians against the Muslims and put to
test the secularity of the Nigerian state (Obi, 2000). As Obi
suggested, Nigerian democratic space is hotly contested terrain,
which partly feeds into the interrogation of the hegemonic nation-
state project and the escalation of violent conflict across the country.
While some of these ethnic group have been appeased with
innovative federal principles such principle of derivation
(13percent as in the case of the Niger-delta state, Development
Commissions and Amnesty) and power sharing quota system to
foster equitable distribution and opportunity among diversities in
the country, the government has sustained a long pattern of
repression of local resistance demanding for autonomy, by
unleashing the might of the state to suppress these ethno-nationalist
manifestations. The incidence of Odi Massacre, Zaki-biam, Onitsha
Gbaramutu Nigerian troops raze down the town in a manner not
conformities with rule of law, were indicative of the repressive
tendencies of ethnic agitation by the state. The story is not different
in the South East were the agitations of the Indigenous People of
Biafra (IPOB) is getting stronger and violent each day. More
recently is the clash between Fulani herdsmen and farmers in
villages in Agatu Local Government of Benue State where over 300
persons were confirmed. These ethnic conflicts have heightened the
feeling of miss giving between the masses and select political class.
Ascenario were citizens of the country are feeling left out and out of
touch with the goings and policy direction of the country. This
situation calls for a democratic system that encourages participation
of its citizenry in issues of governance.
Democracy generally can be defined as government of the people
by the people. This is intricately linked with the participation of the
Participatory Democracy in Context
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people. According to Offor (2006), democracy is a system of
government in which every individual participates in the process of
government maximally or minimally. Young (2000) cautioned that
in principle each member of society in a democracy should be able
to exercise his or her vote in broader terms when it comes to
affecting change: 'Only in a democratic political system, do all
members of a society in principle have the opportunity to try to
influence public policy' (Young, 2000). This orientation takes
cognisance of the reminder by Fung (2006) that when in
contemporary democratic contexts 'there is no canonical form or
institution of direct public participation' the task becomes to
understand the feasible and useful varieties of participation.
This means that participatory democracy would entail that
democracy entitles each individual citizen to speak and be heard - a
notion that is not necessarily conducive to determining the running
of a state. It may also be out of tune with the complexities of running
contemporary, complex national political systems. Participatory
democracy cannot be viewed without referring to the process of
deliberative democracy. Participation is one matter, ability to
influence another. The process of deliberation entails that all parties
are allowed sufficient time within which to argue its particular
viewpoint. In this regard, Abayomi (2010) opined that participatory
democracy is a process emphasizing the broad participation of
constituents in the direction and operation of political systems.
However, participatory democracy tends to advocate more involved
forms of citizens participation than traditional representative
democracy. In another vein, participatory democracy is used with
reference to a community in which every citizen is recognized as
both enabled and encouraged to participate directly and actively in
the dialogues and practices which define, build, and sustain the
common life, the general will' (Roelofs, 1998). Roelofs further
noted that participatory democracy encompasses deliberation and
action. In this sense, deliberation involves participants taking
positions, exchanging information, and possibly changing their
minds. Roelofs nevertheless still recognises that the individual's
right to exercise his or her political power is more about
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'community' within a state, than about direct influence on the power
machinations of the upper echelons of decision making. Yet, part of
the appeal of this participatory democracy is in being acknowledged
as part of the process, or as active in the process of exercising
democratic muscle. It is important to note that participatory
governance is not equal to representative democracy, which is
understood as the regular election of members of Parliament, of
provincial legislatures or councils. Rather, it refers to the manner in
which the elected bodies, and in particular the locally elected ones,
govern between elections. It also refers to a set of structural and
procedural requirements to realise 'community participation' in the
operation of local government. Thus, 'community participation',
more commonly known as 'public participation', is one of the
objectives of the legislation, and 'participatory governance' is the
mechanism through which this is to be realised. Pithouse (2006)
supported those who argue for protest to be regarded as public
participation. Part of his argument is anchored in the reality of
structural violence that is manifested in massive poverty and
inequality. He refutes common perceptions that public participation
requires transformation into civil society organisations that aim at
professionalized engagement in official opportunities for public
participation. He also goes further and suggests that the road to
successful public participation is closely linked to establishing
democratic protest outside of the organisations of party and state.
The author notes that participative democracy can be achieved
through the following modes:
This mode of
participative democracy relates to a range of important
phases of the policy process and governance, and has a
bearing on engagement with members of both the political
and the bureaucratic spheres of government. It is also
extended participation, because these initiatives often
involve participation that helps bolster the conventional
channels of representation. It brings executives,
1. Community-engagement participation.
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legislatives, bureaucrats and citizens together to help
address developmental issues that might have become
neglected in the processes of more conventional
representation and participation.
This mode of participative
democracy may be manifested upon request and initiative
by government, or be of a more spontaneous nature. It may
emanate from community and/or NGO initiatives.
It relates to the notion of
indirect or representative democracy. In this situation, the
populace might be satisfied with having their interests
represented by their elected members of government, across
the respective spheres.
In this mode, civil society
members could regard the formal processes as ineffectual,
and feel that pressure, protest and mobilization are the
required forms of policy participation.
. Most citizens, in some form or another,
receive government and policy-related information. This
would be either directly from government media, or from
the mass electronic and print media on government. Citizens
may use this information to try to become more active
participants in public affairs
The author holds that an assessment of participatory democracy in
Nigeria needs to take account of, in broad terms, (a) conventional
'participation in democratic processes and institutions' (including
elections), (b) participation in deliberative, specifically designed
processes to add to the impact of conventional political
participation, and (c) unconventional processes of public
participation that further supplement and complement the more
mainstream activities. This will create a feeling of belongingness









From the literature reviewed it is clear that Nigeria as a nation is
riddled with a lot of ethnic conflicts. These conflicts results because
of the religion and cultural diversity amongst are people. Most
authors opined that these conflicts results because of a feeling of
marginalization by some ethnic groups. The authors argued that
ethnic conflicts is prominent in Nigeria's political sphere because
many citizens do not participate in the political process and policy
formulation process of the country, so they appear to be left out on
the scheme of things. It is against this background that the author
proffers the deepening and adoption of participative democracy
were citizens are encouraged to be part of the policy making
processes of the government. It is believed that the adoption and
entrenchment of the tenets of true participative democracy will help
to curb the web of ethnic conflicts in Nigeria.
In view of the literatures reviewed, it was recommended that for
participative democracy to be enhanced in Nigeria;
1. Government should create opportunities for participation,
either to sustain or to complement core institutional
opportunities; ƒ
2. The citizens should perceive the participatory opportunities
as meaningful, thus leading to the furthering of the interests
and needs that are intended to be addressed through the
generated opportunities; ƒ
3. It is accepted that not all public participants wish to assume
activist roles; many are therefore satisfied, for example,
with occasional electoral participation, or they rely on the
information-receipt mode of participation in which
information from and about government is relatively
passively received.
4. Public protest could equally enhance participatory
democracy: where it deviates from intra-system, rule-
compliant behaviour, it is interpreted in terms of enhancing
153
participation in that it strives to bring more effective
representation, and ensure effective governance through
better attention to developmental and delivery needs. It
potentially co-exists with intra-system action.
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